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UPDATES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS
iNTeRNaTioNal cRimiNal 
TRiBuNal foR The foRmeR 
yugoslavia
cases aNd PRoceediNgs
The trial of influential Serbian national-
ist and politician Vojislav Šešelj restarted 
on December 7, 2007. Šešelj has been 
awaiting trial at The Hague for five years 
after voluntarily surrendering to the 
Tribunal. His trial was halted last year in 
response to a 28-day hunger strike he con-
ducted in protest over various evidentiary 
matters, including his wish to have the 
book he authored translated into English 
so as to be submitted into evidence. Šešelj 
is the leader of the nationalist Serbian 
Radical Party (SDS), which holds one third 
of the seats in Serbia’s Parliament. He also 
formed and led a notoriously violent mili-
tia group associated with the SDS, popu-
larly known as the Chetniks or Šešelj’s 
Men. He has been indicted for inciting 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
Prosecutors claim that by using inflamma-
tory rhetoric and propaganda, he rallied 
his several-thousand-men-strong militia 
into committing atrocities against civilians 
in Croatia and Bosnia. Observers expect 
Šešelj’s behavior at trial to be similar to 
predecessor defendant Slobodan Miloševic´, 
who frequently shouted obscenities and 
created chaos in the courtroom. The first 
day of Šešelj’s trial proved as dramatic 
as expected with the accused defending 
nationalist views and taking credit for the 
idea and movement behind the creation of 
a “Greater Serbia.” 
One of the men responsible for the 
lengthy and brutal siege of Sarajevo, 
Dragomir Miloševic´, was found guilty on 
December 12, 2007 for committing crimes 
against humanity and violations of the 
laws or customs of war. He was sentenced 
to 33 years’ imprisonment. A Bosnian 
Serb, General Miloševic´ commanded the 
Bosnian Serb Army’s Sarajevo Romanija 
Corps in August 1994. He oversaw the ter-
ror campaign against the besieged city for 
15 months. Under his order the city was 
shelled relentlessly and its residents sub-
ject to sniper fire. One of the more horrific 
mortar attacks that briefly captured the 
world’s attention was the shelling of the 
Markele Market by the Romanija Corps in 
August of 1995. Many Bosnian Serbs have 
maintained that the Bosnian Army shelled 
its own people to stir up international sym-
pathy; however, the Tribunal struck down 
this theory previously. The bench was 
particularly disturbed by the use, under 
Miloševic´  ’s command, of modified air 
bombs to attack densely-packed Sarajevo 
because these bombs are “highly inac-
curate weapon[s]” with “extremely high 
explosive force.” One expert witness stated 
that the bombs could deviate from their 
intended target by up to a kilometer. 
The Appeals Chamber rejected the 
appeal of Dragan Zelenovic ´  on October 31, 
2007 and affirmed his 15-year sentence for 
the torture and rape of Bosnian Muslim 
women and girls from Focˇ    a in eastern 
Bosnia. Zelenovic ´  , a Bosnian Serb soldier 
and de facto military policeman, assisted 
in the capture of about 70 Muslim civilians 
— women, children, and elderly — from 
Fo cˇ    a after the Bosnian Serb Army over-
took the municipality in June of 1992. The 
group was held for several months in dete-
riorating circumstances, subject to starva-
tion and assault. Zelenovic´ raped several 
women, repeatedly, throughout the dura-
tion of their captivity. He was indicted with 
several other members of the Bosnian Serb 
military police and paramilitary groups in 
April of 1992 after being on the run from 
the Tribunal for several years. He pled 
guilty to torture and rape as a crime against 
humanity. 
Rape has long been considered a crime 
that could amount to a crime against 
humanity. The ICTY has recognized that 
sexual violence may be a tool used against 
civilians during war. The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has also 
recognized this, finding rape as an act 
of genocide in the first case before that 
Tribunal. Before the recent ICTY convic-
tion of the men involved in widespread 
rape of women in Focˇ   a , however, interna-
tional tribunals did not prosecute rape as a 
crime against humanity.
To constitute a crime against humanity, 
the crime of rape must be committed as a 
part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population. This ele-
ment is what distinguishes crimes against 
humanity from ordinary crimes. The tar-
geting of a collective group, in the form 
of a civilian population, rather than the 
individual victim, places crimes against 
humanity among the gravest of crimes. Of 
the five other individuals indicted with-
Zelenovic´, the Tribunal convicted three 
— Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovacˇ   ,
and Zoran Vukovic´ — for raping, tortur-
ing, and enslaving a number of Bosnian 
Muslim women and girls. The prosecu-
tion of the rapes committed against the 
women of Fo cˇ  a led to the first convictions 
by the ICTY for not only rape but also for 
enslavement as crimes against humanity.
The remaining two defendants on 
the Focˇ   a indictment, Gojko Jankovic´ and 
Radovan Stankovic´, were transferred to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to stand trial 
before Sarajevo’s War Crimes Chamber. 
Jankovic´ was found guilty of torture and 
rape and sentenced to 34 years’ imprison-
ment. Stankovic´ was convicted of enslave-
ment and rape and sentenced to 20 years’ 
imprisonment. Stankovic´ escaped custody 
in May 2007 and has yet to be appre-
hended.
The acquittal of Sefer Halilovic´, the 
former Deputy Commander and Chief of 
Main Staff of the Army of the Republic 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was affirmed 
by the Appeals Chamber on October 16, 
2007. The Prosecution appealed the Trial 
Chamber’s 2005 judgment that Halilovic´ 
was not responsible under a theory of 
command responsibility for atrocities com-
mitted by Bosnian troops in the villages of 
Grabovica and Uzdol in Herzegovina in 
September 1993. The Appeals Chamber 
affirmed the acquittal stating that the 
Prosecution had failed to establish that 
Halilovic´ exercised the required degree of 
effective control over the troops to estab-
lish superior responsibility.
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coNTemPT of couRT chaRges
Two more witnesses scheduled to testify 
for the Prosecution in the Haradinaj et al. 
case were indicted for contempt of court in 
November 2007. The two witnesses, Avni 
Krasniqi and Sadri Selca, were supposed 
to testify for the Prosecution and were 
subpoenaed, but despite assurances of wit-
ness protection, the two witnesses refused. 
The Prosecution felt that the witnesses 
had been intimidated, believing there have 
been problems with witness intimidation 
throughout the trial. Haradinaj, a popular, 
well-known former Prime Minister and 
member of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA), is charged with participation in a 
joint criminal enterprise aimed at obtain-
ing full control over a partially KLA-
controlled region through forcible removal 
and mistreatment of Serbians and Kosovar 
Albanians believed not to support KLA 
goals. The difficulty the Prosecution has 
faced in convincing witnesses to testify has 
led it to seek witness subpoenas and other 
measures for witness protection.
a faReWell To foRmeR 
PRosecuToR del PoNTe
On January 1, 2008, the appointment 
of the ICTY’s new Prosecutor Serge 
Brammertz came into effect. Brammertz 
is the fifth Prosecutor to take office at the 
Tribunal, following Ramon Escovar Salom, 
Richard Goldstone, Louise Arbor, and 
Carla Del Ponte. Brammertz comes to the 
ICTY from his position as Commissioner of 
the International Independent Investigation 
Commission into the assassination of 
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik 
al-Hariri.
Carla Del Ponte leaves her eight-
year tenure at the Tribunal for a position 
as Swiss Ambassador to Argentina. In 
Del Ponte’s final address to the Security 
Council regarding the progress of the 
Tribunal, she warned of meddling from 
Serbia. She accused the Serbian govern-
ment of blocking the arrest of the two 
most wanted leaders of the political and 
military branches of the former Bosnian 
Serb Government, Radovan Karadžic´ and 
Ratko Mladic´ , respectively. Del Ponte 
claimed that Serbian officials refused to 
conduct “even the most basic investiga-
tory procedures” and that the two men had 
been “repeatedly sighted” in Serbia. She 
said that despite rhetorical commitment to 
capture and hand over the four remaining 
fugitives, Serbia has “no clear roadmap, 
no clear plan in the search for fugitives, 
no serious leads, and no sign that serious 
efforts have been taken to arrest the fugi-
tives.” Del Ponte recognized that Serbia 
has made efforts to cooperate with the 
Tribunal, such as establishing a National 
Security Council to serve as a link between 
the Tribunal and the government, but that 
these steps are “slow and inefficient.” She 
alleges that Serbia negotiated with Ratko 
Mladic´  regarding his transfer to The Hague 
as recently as 2006, but that Serbia refused 
to arrest and transfer him involuntarily. 
Del Ponte repeated her oft-stated warn-
ing to the European Union (EU) not to 
consider Serbia as a candidate for acces-
sion until Karadžic´ and Mladic´ are appre-
hended. Unfortunately, the European 
Union appears to be moving forward with 
the process regardless of whether Serbia 
complies with the Tribunal’s demands. 
After pro-western Boris Tadic´ ’s reelection 
as President of Serbia in February 2008, 
the EU Enlargement Commissioner hinted 
that he was ready to sign a Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia, 
a precursor to accession. The Belgians and 
Dutch are sticking to Del Ponte’s message, 
however, insisting that no SAA be signed 
until Serbia hands over the remaining 
defendants.
Just days before his trip to Brussels 
to meet with the EU Enlargement 
Commissioner and foreign policy chief, 
the new Chief Prosecutor issued a state-
ment heralding the capture of the four 
remaining fugitives as the “absolute prior-
ity” of the Tribunal. While Del Ponte was 
renowned for her public criticism of Serbia, 
Brammertz is known for subtle diplo-
macy and quiet work behind the scenes. 
Hopefully, Serbia will respond positively 
to Brammertz’s style of persuasion, and 




mikaeli muhimaNa v.  
The PRosecuToR, case No. 
icTR-95-1B-a
On May 21, 2007, the Appeals Chamber 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) issued its judgment in the 
case Mikaeli Muhimana v. the Prosecutor. 
The Accused had appealed from an April 
28, 2005 conviction for genocide and the 
crimes against humanity of rape and mur-
der, for which he had received multiple 
life sentences. A majority of the Appeals 
Chamber reversed the factual findings of 
the Trial Chamber regarding two acts of 
rape and one act of murder, but affirmed 
the sentences of life imprisonment for each 
of Muhimana’s convictions.
Among the grounds of appeal submit-
ted by Muhimana against his April 2005 
conviction was the claim that the Trial 
Chamber erred in law and in fact by finding 
that he had the intent to commit genocide, 
when it was established at trial that, inter 
alia, he had a Tutsi wife whom he pro-
tected through the end of the war and that 
he had saved other individual Tutsis. The 
Appeals Chamber unanimously rejected 
this claim, noting that the Trial Chamber 
made a number of findings in support 
of its conclusion that the Appellant par-
ticipated in killing and seriously injuring 
Tutsi victims with the intention to commit 
genocide, and stating that “evidence of 
limited and selective assistance towards a 
few individuals does not preclude a trier of 
fact from reasonably finding the requisite 
intent to commit genocide.” 
Muhimana also raised several claims of 
legal and factual errors based on the Trial 
Chamber’s assessment of different wit-
nesses. Nearly all of these claims were dis-
missed on the grounds that the Appellant 
failed to demonstrate either “that no rea-
sonable trier of fact could have reached 
the finding” based on the challenged testi-
mony, or that “the error occasioned a mis-
carriage of justice.” However, a majority 
of the Appeals Chamber did agree with 
Muhimana that the Trial Chamber erred in 
fact when convicting the Appellant for two 
rapes based on the testimony of someone 
who was not an eyewitness to the alleged 
crimes. While the Appeals Chamber noted 
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that it is permissible to base a convic-
tion on circumstantial evidence, and that 
the witness did provide sufficient evi-
dence to establish that two victims were 
raped inside the Appellant’s home, the 
testimony was insufficient to establish 
that it was the Appellant, as opposed to 
another perpetrator, that committed the 
crimes. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber 
reversed the factual findings relating to 
these two rapes. Nonetheless, it modified 
neither the Appellant’s conviction for rape 
as a crime against humanity, nor the sen-
tence imposed by the Trial Chamber for 
that crime, as the conviction was based 
on a finding that Appellant had commit-
ted 12 acts of rape, only two of which 
were reversed. Judges Shahabuddeen and 
Schomburg dissented, arguing that it was 
the Trial Chamber, and not the Appeals 
Chamber, that was in the best position to 
determine whether the facts sufficiently 
established Muhimana’s role in the alleged 
crimes. 
The Appellant was also successful in 
his claim that the Trial Chamber erred 
in finding that he had killed a particular 
individual, namely a pregnant woman, in 
mid-May 1994 on Rugona Hill, because 
the indictment failed to give the Appellant 
proper notice of the time and place of 
the alleged crime and his alleged role 
in it. The Appeals Chamber found that 
the indictment was in fact defective and 
that, contrary to the findings of the Trial 
Chamber, the defect had not been cured 
through information included in a Pre-Trial 
Brief. The Appeals Chamber recognized 
that, under some circumstances, a defec-
tive indictment may be cured by informa-
tion such as a summary of anticipated 
testimony submitted in a Pre-Trial Brief, 
but in this case, the information provided 
in the brief did not “simply add greater 
detail in a consistent manner with a more 
general allegation already pleaded in the 
Indictment, [but] … modifie[d] the time, 
location, and physical perpetrator, matters 
that were already specifically pleaded in 
the Indictment, albeit in a materially differ-
ent manner.” As a result, a majority of the 
Appeals Chamber invalidated Muhimana’s 
conviction on one count of murder as a 
crime against humanity. Once again, how-
ever, the Appeals Chamber found that the 
error neither invalidated the Appellant’s 
conviction for murder as a crime against 
humanity — as the conviction was based 
on several murders — nor the sentence of 
life imprisonment for the conviction. Judge 
Schomburg dissented from the majority, 
finding that the defect in the indictment 
had been cured because the information 
contained in the Pre-Trial Brief informed 
the Appellant clearly, consistently, and in 
a sufficient manner about the crime for 
which he was charged, as well as the place 
and time at which the crime occurred.
Finally, the Appellant claimed that the 
Trial Chamber erred in sentencing him 
to life imprisonment on the grounds that 
the Chamber failed to consider mitigating 
circumstances in violation of Article 23 
of the ICTR Statute. Muhimana argued 
that several factors should have mitigated 
his sentence, including the fact that he 
had no prior criminal convictions; he was 
only 33 years old during the relevant 
period; he is the father of nine children; 
that he protected several Tutsis during the 
events of 1994; and that he occupied a low 
position in the Rwandan administrative 
structure at the time of his crimes. The 
Appeals Chamber rejected the Appellant’s 
claims, explaining that: (i) the record did 
not show that Muhimana offered substan-
tiating evidence in support of his alleged 
mitigating factors prior to sentencing; (ii) 
although the Trial Chamber is required to 
consider mitigating circumstances, it is 
under no obligation to actually mitigate a 
sentence based on the factors offered; and 
(iii) even when mitigating circumstances 
exist, a Trial Chamber can impose a life 
imprisonment sentence when the gravity 
of the crimes so requires. The Appeals 
Chamber noted that the Appellant made 
no allegations challenging the gravity of 
his crimes.
aloys simBa v. The PRosecuToR, 
case No. icTR-01-76-a
The Appeals Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) affirmed the Trial Chamber’s con-
viction of Aloys Simba on November 27, 
2007. A retired lieutenant colonel and 
member of the “Comrades of the fifth 
of July,” the group responsible for the 
coup d’état that brought former President 
Juvenal Habyarimana to power in 1973, 
Simba was also a member of parliament 
from 1989 to 1993. The Trial Chamber 
found the Appellant guilty of genocide and 
extermination as a crime against humanity 
based on his participation in a joint crimi-
nal enterprise (JCE) to kill Tutsi civilians 
at Murambi Technical School and Kaduha 
Parish. He was sentenced to 25 years in 
prison for his crimes. Simba challenged 
the Trial Chamber’s judgment and his sen-
tence based on fourteen separate grounds 
of appeal, all of which were dismissed 
by the Appeals Chamber. The Prosecutor 
also challenged Simba’s sentence, say-
ing that a single sentence of 25 years was 
insufficient. Again, the Appeals Chamber 
dismissed this ground of appeal.
Among the grounds of appeal raised by 
Simba was the claim that he was denied 
a fair trial because two witnesses refused 
to appear before the Tribunal to testify in 
his defense. According to Simba, these 
witnesses, referred to as BJK1 and HBK, 
were prevented from testifying due to the 
“interference” of Rwandan government 
officials. The Appeals Chamber stated that 
it could conceive of situations where a fair 
trial would not be possible because “wit-
nesses crucial to the Defense case refuse to 
testify due to State interference.” However, 
to establish such a claim, it is incumbent 
on the Defense to demonstrate that such 
interference in fact took place, and that 
the Defense “exhausted all available mea-
sures to secure the taking of the witnesses’ 
testimony.” In Simba’s case, the Appeals 
Chamber first found that the Appellant had 
not fulfilled his burden of establishing that 
Witness BJK1’s refusal to testify was a 
result of government interference. By con-
trast, the Appeals Chamber agreed with the 
Trial Chamber that there was evidence that 
the government interfered with Witness 
HBK’s testimony. However, the Appeals 
Chamber also agreed with the lower court 
that the witness’s testimony would likely 
have been of limited probative value. 
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber found 
that the Defense had failed to exhaust all 
available measures to secure the taking of 
the witness’s testimony. Hence, Appellant’s 
challenges based on the unavailability of 
witnesses in his defense were dismissed. 
The Appellant also raised several chal-
lenges to his conviction for genocide and 
extermination as a crime against humanity 
pursuant to a JCE. Among these chal-
lenges was a claim that an accused cannot 
be held responsible under a JCE theory of 
liability unless the accused participated in 
the planning of the JCE itself. Specifically, 
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Appellant pointed to the fact that the 
Trial Chamber held that he was criminally 
liable for crimes committed at Murambi 
Technical School and Kaduha Parish, 
despite finding that the evidence failed 
to establish that the Appellant was either 
the “architect” of the attacks or that he 
“played a role in their planning.” However, 
the Appeals Chamber determined that it is 
“well-established that it is not necessary 
for a participant to have participated in the 
planning of a JCE in order to be convicted 
for participation in it.” Simba also claimed 
that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that 
he “shared the common purpose of killing 
Tutsi” in Murambi and Kaduha merely 
as a result of his presence and conduct in 
those areas. The Appeals Chamber rejected 
this argument, stating inter alia that Simba 
was found not only to have been present 
at the two massacre sites, but also to have 
distributed weapons and encouragement to 
the assailants, and thus it was reasonable 
to conclude that the Appellant shared the 
intent to carry out the common purpose of 
killing Tutsi at Murambi Technical School 
and Kaduha Parish. 
Finally, the Appellant raised a num-
ber of challenges to his conviction for 
genocide with respect to the massacres at 
Murambi and Kaduha Parish. For exam-
ple, he argued that the Trial Chamber 
erred by not requiring the Prosecution to 
prove the existence of a plan or policy 
as a fundamental element of the crime of 
genocide. The Appeals Chamber easily 
dismissed this challenge, noting that under 
the jurisprudence of both the ICTR and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia, the existence of 
an agreement or a plan is not an element 
required for a conviction of genocide. 
The Appeals Chamber also rejected the 
Appellant’s claim that the specific intent to 
commit genocide must be formed prior to 
the commission of genocidal acts, holding 
that the Trial Chamber correctly held that 
it is the existence of the intent to commit 
genocide at the moment the acts are com-
mitted that matters.
sPecial couRT foR sieRRa leoNe
PRosecuToR v. moiNiNa fofaNa 
aNd allieu koNdeWa, case No. 
scsl-04-14-T
On August 2, 2007, the Trial Chamber 
of the Special Court of Sierra Leone 
(SCSL) delivered its judgment in the case 
of Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana and 
Allieu Kondewa. The case, which was the 
second case to conclude at the SCSL trial 
level, involved the conviction of two top 
members of Sierra Leone’s Civil Defense 
Forces (CDF), a paramilitary organiza-
tion that fought in support of the elected 
Sierra Leonean government during the 
country’s civil war. Each was convicted by 
a majority of the Trial Chamber of either 
committing or bearing superior responsi-
bility for the following acts in violation 
of Article 3 Common to the Four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and of Additional 
Protocol II to those Conventions: murder, 
cruel treatment, pillage and issuing collec-
tive punishments. In addition, Kondewa 
was convicted on one count of “other seri-
ous violations of international humanitar-
ian law” in the form of conscripting child 
soldiers. Both men were unanimously 
acquitted of the crimes against humanity of 
murder and other inhumane acts, as well as 
the war crime of terrorism. Justice Bankole 
Thompson partially dissented from the 
judgment, writing a separate opinion in 
which he would have acquitted Fofana and 
Kondewa on all counts based, inter alia, 
on findings that their acts were dictated 
by necessity and thus were legally defen-
sible. Justice Thompson also concluded 
that the Accused benefited from a defense 
referred to as salus civis suprema lex est, 
which means “the safety of the state is the 
supreme law.”
Initially, the CDF trial involved three 
accused: Sam Hinga Norman, who was 
the National Coordinator of the CDF; 
Fofana, the National Director of War; and 
Kondewa, who was High Priest of the 
CDF. However, Norman died in surgery in 
February 2007, while the trial was ongo-
ing, and the Trial Chamber terminated his 
proceedings three months later. According 
to the indictments against Norman, Fofana, 
and Kondewa, each was responsible for 
eight counts of crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and other inhumane acts. The 
Prosecutor charged that each Accused bore 
criminal responsibility because, inter alia, 
the alleged crimes were committed as part 
of a joint criminal enterprise (JCE), or were 
a reasonably foreseeable consequence of 
that enterprise. The common “plan, pur-
pose or design” of the CDF, according 
to the Prosecutor, was to “use any means 
necessary to defeat the RUF/AFRC forces 
and to gain and exercise control over 
the territory of Sierra Leone.” Notably, 
Trial Chamber II of the SCSL, which 
presided over the trial against the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), 
had refused to consider JCE as a theory 
of criminal liability in that case on the 
grounds that the common plan described 
in the AFRC indictment — namely, to gain 
and exercise political power and control 
over the territory of Sierra Leone — was 
“not inherently criminal.”
Fofana raised a similar challenge in 
the CDF case, arguing inter alia that 
the Prosecutor did not plead the “alleged 
criminal purpose of the JCE” with suf-
ficient specificity. However, despite the 
similar descriptions of the underlying 
“plan, purpose or design” in the two cases, 
Trial Chamber I, without directly respond-
ing to Fofana’s challenge regarding the 
“alleged criminal purpose of the JCE,” 
refused to dismiss the JCE charges in 
the CDF case. Nevertheless, in analyz-
ing the alleged criminal responsibility of 
Fofana and Kondewa for any given act, the 
Chamber repeatedly found that “[a]lthough 
on the basis of the evidence adduced it 
appears that Norman, Fofana, Kondewa 
and their subordinates may have acted in 
concert with each other, we find that there 
is no evidence upon which to conclude 
beyond reasonable doubt that they did so 
in order to further a common purpose, plan 
or design to commit criminal acts.” Thus, 
neither Fofana nor Kondewa were con-
victed for any crime on the basis of a JCE 
theory of liability.
With respect to the four counts of war 
crimes for which the Accused were con-
victed, the Chamber found that between 
November 1997 and December 1999, 
Fofana and Kondewa were responsible, at 
times directly and at times through their 
roles as superiors, for acts of murder, 
cruel treatment, pillage, and issuing collec-
tive punishments in violation of Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of 
Additional Protocol II. These acts included 
the killing of captured enemy combatants 
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and “collaborators,” infliction of suffering 
or injury upon them, and destruction of 
their houses. The Trial Chamber acquitted 
both Fofana and Kondewa of aiding and 
abetting the war crime of terrorism based 
on a finding that it had not been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the pri-
mary perpetrator, Norman, acted with the 
specific intent to spread terror, and that 
therefore it had not been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Fofana and Kondewa 
had the requisite knowledge to be con-
victed of aiding and abetting terrorism as 
a war crime. 
The Trial Chamber also unanimously 
acquitted both Fofana and Kondewa of 
the charges of murder and other inhumane 
acts as crimes against humanity because, 
despite establishing that the alleged acts 
formed part of a widespread attack, the 
Prosecutor failed to prove that “the civil-
ian population was the primary object of 
the attack.” In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court noted the Prosecutor’s admission 
that the CDF had “fought for the restora-
tion of democracy.”
Finally, Trial Chamber I convicted 
Kondewa of committing other serious vio-
lations of international humanitarian law 
through his conscription and use of child 
soldiers under the age of 15. Fofana was 
acquitted under this charge, based on a 
finding of insufficient evidence, despite 
factual findings by the Court that Fofana 
had been in the presence of child soldiers 
at the headquarters for the CDF High 
Command and had attended a meeting at 
which Norman had stated that the “adult 
fighters were doing less than the children.” 
By contrast, the Chamber found that, as 
the CDF’s High Priest, Kondewa was in 
charge of initiating new members into 
the CDF, which included children under 
the age of 15. These children did not 
merely partake in a “societal initiation,” 
the Chamber held, but were given a potion 
to rub on their bodies for strength, put into 
military training and forced to participate 
in battle. Kondewa also used children at 
checkpoints and as bodyguards, supplying 
them with knives and guns. The Chamber 
found that Kondewa was aware that many 
of the CDF’s soldiers were younger than 
15, noting that children as young as seven 
danced before him prior to battle. 
A sentencing hearing was held several 
weeks after the conviction of Fofana and 
Kondewa, and on October 9, 2007, the 
Trial Chamber issued its sentencing judg-
ment. Although the Chamber handed down 
separate sentences, ranging from three to 
eight years, for each guilty count entered 
against Fofana and Kondewa, respectively, 
it ordered that the sentences be served 
concurrently. Thus, Fofana will serve a 
total of six years, and Kondewa a total 
of eight years, with credit for time served 
since taken into custody on May 29, 2003. 
These sentences stand in sharp contrast 
to those handed down to each of the con-
victed members of the AFRC group in July 
2007, which range from 45 to 50 years’ 
imprisonment. The Trial Chamber in the 
CDF case explained the relatively lenient 
sentences given to Fofana and Kondewa by 
stating that harsh sentences would be coun-
terproductive to deterrence and the Court’s 
overall objectives of justice, peace and 
reconciliation. In determining the appro-
priate sentences, the Chamber took into 
account the motivation of each accused to 
reinstate democracy and the surrounding 
circumstances of the war. It acknowledged 
the “justice or propriety” of pro-democracy 
armed forces, but also stated that the laws 
of war must be observed even when a 
group is defending legitimate causes. 
iNTeRNaTioNal cRimiNal couRT
PRosecuTioN of sexual violeNce 
iN The democRaTic RePuBlic of 
The coNgo
The International Criminal Court (ICC) 
has received much criticism due to the 
narrow focus of its efforts to bring jus-
tice and accountability to the situation in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC). Specifically, until the fall of 2007, 
the Prosecutor’s investigations into wide-
spread violations in the DRC resulted in 
the issuance of an arrest warrant for only 
one individual, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, for 
the conscription of child soldiers during his 
role as leader of the Union of Congolese 
Patriots. The arrest warrant failed to ade-
quately address the broad range of viola-
tions attributable to parties to the conflict 
in the Ituri region of Eastern DRC. 
ICC critics were partially mollified by 
the arrest and transfer of a second accused, 
General Germain Katanga, chief of staff of 
the Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri, to 
the ICC’s detention center at Scheveningen 
in October 2007. Katanga’s arrest war-
rant notes that there is reason to believe 
he is responsible for a number of crimes 
falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction. The 
case against Katanga seems, therefore, 
to more accurately reflect the full scope 
and gravity of violations reported than 
did charges against Lubanga. Although 
reports indicate that crimes of a sexual 
nature have been rampant in the DRC, the 
Prosecution did not include them among 
the charges against Lubanga for reasons 
that may be related to the availability of 
evidence. The decision not to include the 
charges may have also been based on 
Moreno-Ocampo’s Prosecutorial Strategy 
of focused investigations and prosecutions, 
in which a limited number of incidents and 
witnesses are selected to permit expedi-
tious trials. The broader charges against 
Katanga may signify a shift away from 
the strategic focus on a limited sample of 
incidents and types of criminality. Katanga 
is charged with the sexual enslavement of 
women and girls both as a crime against 
humanity and as a war crime. 
The prosecution of sexual violence 
in armed conflict is critical due to the 
alarming rate at which militant groups are 
employing sexual violence as a strategy for 
attaining military objectives. Authorities 
agree that the scale and brutality of sexual 
violence in the DRC indicates the existence 
of coordinated strategies whereby militant 
groups seek to gain military advantage 
by terrorizing, weakening, and destroy-
ing civilian communities through sexual 
violence. International law emphatically 
prohibits such conduct, as evidenced in 
both custom and treaties. 
Sexual violence during armed conflict 
has been prohibited since as early as the 
fifteenth century when 27 judges of the 
Holy Roman Empire convicted Peter van 
Hagenbach, a knight acting under the com-
mand of the Duke of Burgundy, because 
he allowed his troops to rape and kill civil-
ians during the siege of a German town. 
Eminent publicist Hugo Grotius reaffirmed 
this prohibition in the mid-seventeenth 
century, and this prohibition is reflected 
in many domestic manuals, including the 
influential 1863 U.S. Lieber Code that 
governed American Civil War soldiers’ 
conduct. By the middle of the twentieth 
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century, many national courts had con-
firmed that rape constitutes not only a 
violation of the laws and customs of war, 
but also gives rise to individual criminal 
responsibility. Authorities including the 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
Rome Statute of the ICC have noted that 
the act of rape constitutes the willful inflic-
tion of “great suffering” amounting to a 
grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. 
Finally, sexual violence is prohibited under 
the Rome Statute. Katanga, for example, 
is charged specifically with the sexual 
enslavement of women and girls, punish-
able both as a crime against humanity 
under Art. 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute, and 
as a war crime under Art. 8(2)(b)(xxii).
Despite the deep-rooted prohibition on 
sexual violence in armed conflict, the 
practice continues to constitute a disturb-
ingly common tactic employed by warring 
factions in the central African conflicts 
that have given rise to ICC investigations 
and arrest warrants. This is evidenced 
in part by the outstanding arrest war-
rants for Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti 
of the Ugandan rebel group, the Lord’s 
Resistance Army, and Ahmed Harun and 
Ali Kosheyb of Sudan — all charged with 
crimes of sexual violence. In the DRC, 
organizations serving victims of sexual 
violence estimate that 14,000 rapes have 
occurred in North Kivu since 2004, and 
around 1,400 in the past six months alone. 
Katanga’s trial represents the ICC’s first 
opportunity to bring its own formulation 
of this centuries-old prohibition to bear on 
the continuing and unlawful use of sexual 
violence in armed conflict. 
NexT sTePs aNd NeW 
iNvesTigaTioNs iN The  
daRfuR siTuaTioN
Further steps the Office of the Prosecutor 
took last fall that sought to improve the 
ICC’s effectiveness involved increasing 
pressure on Sudan to cooperate with the 
outstanding arrest warrants, and promising 
to open up new investigations in the Darfur 
Situation. On December 6, 2007, in the 
Prosecutor’s sixth address to the Security 
Council on Darfur, he stressed that Sudan 
“is not fulfilling its duty to protect its 
citizens, and is allowing members of the 
government to attack them.” Highlighting 
what many see as Sudan’s flagrant disre-
gard for United Nations (UN) efforts to 
intervene through diplomacy and the ICC, 
the Prosecutor deplored Sudan’s failure to 
protect its citizens and failure to cooperate 
with the ICC in continuing “in full sight of 
the international community.” 
The Prosecutor called on the Security 
Council to send a strong and unanimous 
message to the Sudanese government to 
comply with Resolution 1593 and execute 
arrest warrants for Ahmed Haroun, Minister 
of State for Humanitarian Affairs, and 
Ali Kushayb, a Janjaweed militia leader, 
who the Sudanese government recently 
released from prison despite the ICC arrest 
warrant. Most Security Council members, 
other attending UN Member States, and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
responded by urging support for the ICC, 
but the statement was soon abandoned due 
to Chinese and Russian opposition. While 
this was a disappointing show of political 
will, human rights groups have noted that 
the statement would not have added to 
Sudan’s existing obligation under Security 
Council Resolution 1593 to comply with 
the ICC’s arrest warrants with respect to 
the Darfur crisis.
The Prosecutor also announced plans 
to investigate two new cases. The first 
involves ongoing attacks on Sudan’s inter-
nally displaced persons living in tempo-
rary camps. He emphasized that the evi-
dence indicates “[a] calculated, organized 
campaign by Sudanese officials to attack 
individuals and further destroy the social 
fabric of the society.” The evidence, he 
says, “points not to chaotic and isolated 
acts, but to a pattern of attacks.” Notably, 
the Prosecutor attributes the attacks to the 
Sudanese government. He has indicated 
that he will trace responsibility up the 
chain of command and seek to identify 
“[those] bearing the greatest responsibil-
ity for ongoing attacks against civilians; 
[those] … maintaining Haroun in a posi-
tion to commit crimes, [and those] … 
instructing.” 
Such an investigation, if pursued, 
would represent an aggressive approach to 
stemming the flow of tolerance that char-
acterizes political and military command 
structures that allow or condone grave 
violations of the rules of armed conflict 
protecting civilians. As many critics note, 
while it is important to try military com-
manders for improper conduct, impunity 
must end for political leaders that plan and 
sponsor armed hostilities in violation of 
international law. 
The Prosecutor’s second new investi-
gation involves attacks on humanitarian 
workers and peacekeepers. In particular, 
the Prosecutor plans to investigate an attack 
on African Union peacekeepers in Darfur 
that left ten dead and eight wounded last 
fall. For aid groups and peacekeepers to 
function properly in armed conflict, inter-
national law prohibits armed groups from 
subjecting them to military attack. Where 
mass atrocities have caused the deaths of 
250,000 people and displaced 2.5 million, 
the importance of such an investigation 
rests in large part on its power to deter 
future attacks. This is critical to allowing 
humanitarian workers to function during 
armed conflict and to stymie the escalation 
of civilian damages. Otherwise, humanitar-
ian workers are largely limited to repairing 
avoidable damages after hostilities cease.
The assemBly of sTaTes PaRTies
The ICC’s governing body, the 
Assembly of States Parties (ASP) to the 
Rome Statute, concluded its sixth meeting 
in December 2007 at UN Headquarters in 
New York. The ASP elected three new 
judges to replace judges who resigned 
before the end of their nine-year terms. 
Fumiko Saiga of Japan will finish Judge 
Claude Jorda’s term and is eligible for re-
election for an additional nine-year term. 
Bruno Cotte of France will serve the 
remainder of Judge Maureen Clark’s term, 
and Daniel David Nsereko of Uganda will 
replace Judge Karl Hudson-Phillips. The 
ASP enhanced the Trust Fund for Victims 
to allow greater flexibility for earmarking 
donations and adopted a recommendation 
of the Committee on Budget and Finance 
not to provide increased resources for legal 
aid in the Office of Public Counsel for the 
Defense.
The Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression continued discuss-
ing definitions of aggression; the ASP 
appointed a Focal Point on cooperation, 
emphasized as a result of Sudan’s defiance 
of ICC arrest warrants; the ASP increased 
assistance to ICC outreach activities; and 
the Prosecutor announced new investiga-
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tions on three continents — one of which is 
thought to be Latin America, where a del-
egation has met with victims and officials 
in Colombia. Finally, the ASP welcomed 
Japan and Chad as new States Parties, 
bringing the total number of ratifications 
of the Rome Statute to 105.
hyBRid aNd iNTeRNaTioNalized 
TRiBuNals
The sPecial TRiBuNal  
foR leBaNoN
The United Nations (UN) recently took 
important steps to create a Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon to try those accused of the 2005 
assassination of former Lebanese Prime 
Minister Rafik Hariri. A divided Lebanese 
Government failed to agree on a tribunal. 
As a result, in early May 2007 current 
Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora 
sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon requesting the UN establish the 
tribunal as a matter of urgency. On May 
30, the UN Security Council adopted a 
resolution formally endorsing the tribu-
nal’s creation; ten Council members voted 
for the resolution and five abstained. 
The tribunal’s mandate is to try indi-
viduals suspected of assassinating Hariri, 
killed on February 14, 2005, when explo-
sives were set off as his motorcade drove 
through Beirut. The tribunal has the 
authority to try those responsible for other 
assassinated Lebanese political leaders. 
A minority of Lebanese judges and a 
majority of foreign judges will sit in each 
chamber of the international hybrid tribu-
nal. According to UN Security Council 
Resolution 1664 (2006), the tribunal will 
be “of an international character based 
on the highest international standards of 
criminal justice.” Although international 
in nature, the Special Tribunal will imple-
ment Lebanese law. The harshest penalty 
the tribunal can administer is life impris-
onment.
In late December 2007, the UN 
reached an important agreement with the 
Dutch government to house the tribu-
nal in Leidschendam, a city bordering 
The Hague. The tribunal will be located 
in a building that until recently housed 
the Dutch AIVD intelligence service. The 
Netherlands stipulated that as a condi-
tion for hosting the tribunal, convicted 
persons would not serve sentences in the 
Netherlands. Moreover, the Netherlands 
requires the UN and its member states to 
finance the tribunal, not the Dutch gov-
ernment. Mr. Ban estimates the tribunal 
will cost $120 million over three years. 
UN member states have already donated 
$30 million. Once the Dutch Parliament 
ratifies the agreement it will be officially 
finalized. 
In a January press conference, Mr. 
Ban announced the tribunal’s creation and 
affirmed that the UN and the Lebanese 
government were making “good progress” 
coordinating efforts. Nevertheless, he was 
concerned that Lebanese legislators failed 
to resolve the deadlock over the election 
of a new Lebanese president. Internal 
governmental strife will make it difficult 
for Lebanon to fully assist the UN in its 
investigation. Mr. Ban noted that he would 
announce the names of the tribunal’s judges 
once preparations were complete.
The WaR cRimes chamBeR of 
The couRT of BosNia  
aNd heRzegoviNa
On October 4, 2007, the Appeals 
Chamber of the War Crimes Chamber of 
the State Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(WCC) confirmed its conviction of former 
Serb military member Radisav Ljubinac, 
for persecuting Bosniak civilians in the 
Rogatica Municipality while acting in his 
official capacity. Ljubinac was convicted, 
on the basis of aiding and abetting, of 
three counts of crimes against humanity 
as persecution: 1) participating in forcible 
relocation of Bosniak civilians; 2) com-
mitting inhumane acts of violence against 
detained civilians in the Rasadnik camp, 
with the intent of inflicting great suffering; 
and 3) transferring 27 civilians to the vil-
lage of Duljevac, where Serb forces used 
them as human shields and later executed 
them. Ljubinac received a sentence of ten 
years imprisonment for his crimes.
The Prosecution had to establish that 
Ljubinac committed criminal offenses out-
lined in Article 172 of the Criminal Code 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina (CC BiH) and that 
the chapeau elements of crimes against 
humanity were present. The chapeau ele-
ments require that there be a widespread 
or systematic attack; that the attack be 
directed against any civilian population; 
that the Accused know of such an attack; 
that his acts be part of the attack and 
that the accused know that his acts were 
part of the attack. To prove the crimes 
were committed as acts of persecution, the 
Prosecution had to establish that Ljubinac 
acted with discriminatory intent against 
the victims because they were part of a 
political, racial, ethnic, religious, national, 
cultural, gender or otherwise identifiable 
group, and that discriminatory acts resulted 
in the deprivation of a fundamental human 
right.
The Prosecution sought to prove a 
widespread or systematic attack took place 
against Bosniak civilians in Rogatica by 
establishing judicial notice of that fact, 
as proven by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
in Prosecutor v. Momcilo Krajisnik. Article 
4 of the Law on the Transfer of Cases 
(which governs Rule 11 bis transfers of 
accused from the ICTY to the WCC) 
allows the Court “to accept as proven those 
facts that are established by legally binding 
decisions in any other proceedings by the 
ICTY … .” The Prosecution must move to 
have the requested facts established as evi-
dence, and the defense is given an oppor-
tunity to rebut alleged facts. Establishing 
judicial notice of facts proven by the ICTY 
has been an important tool for making the 
trials more efficient.
Another key issue raised in most WCC 
trials is the question of which law to apply. 
The Defense, employing a principle of 
legality argument, claimed the Criminal 
Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (CC SFRY) should be utilized, 
since that criminal code was in force at the 
time the crimes were committed. Under the 
CC SFRY, the category of crimes against 
humanity did not exist. The Trial Chamber 
held that the CC BiH applies, adopted in 
2003 to govern all WCC trials.
Although crimes against humanity were 
not codified in the CC SFRY, such crimes 
were established as a part of customary 
international law when the accused com-
mitted them. As such, the court concluded, 
the principle of legality is kept intact 
through the application of the CC BiH. 
Moreover, the acts were codified as spe-
cific crimes under the CC SFRY. Under 
Article 4 of the CC BiH, if a law has been 
amended after the perpetration of a crime, 
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the law that envisages the more lenient 
punishment should be applied. The court 
stayed true to this principle as well. Under 
the CC SFRY, the applicable punishment 
was the death penalty, but under the CC 
BiH, Ljubinac received the more lenient 
punishment of ten years’ imprisonment.
Strong evidence from victims or first-
hand witnesses exists proving Ljubinac’s 
role in aiding and abetting in the crimes of 
persecution of forcible transfer of Bosniak 
men, women, and children, the severe beat-
ings of civilian detainees, and the transfer 
of a group of 27 civilians to Duljevac where 
they were used as human shields and later 
executed. The Court identified two main 
aggravating factors; first, it considered 
forcible transfer an especially grave crime, 
as it enabled the greater plan of ethnic 
cleansing. Second, aiding in the severe 
beating of helpless civilians and their use 
as human shields exemplified a high level 
of cruelty, and commission of those crimes 
as persecution further aggravated the cir-
cumstances. Ljubinac was acquitted of 
three counts of crimes against humanity, 
including other acts of persecution and 
murder, due to a lack of evidence. 
On appeal, the Defense again raised 
the applicability of the CC BiH. Using 
the same rationale as the Trial Chamber, 
the Appellate Chamber confirmed that 
the CC BiH was correctly applied. The 
Prosecution argued there was sufficient 
evidence to convict Ljubinac on the three 
acquitted charges, but the Appellate 
Chamber confirmed the Trial Chamber’s 
ruling that a lack of evidence existed prov-
ing the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
The Prosecution then argued for a 
longer sentence. The Trial Chamber had 
viewed Ljubinac’s alcoholism as a mitigat-
ing factor in the sentencing, reasoning that 
the accused’s desire to become a valued 
member of an organization (the Serb mili-
tary) should be viewed as a consequence of 
his disease and the resulting social stigma, 
and therefore not entirely in his control. 
The Appellate Chamber disagreed, saying, 
“[T]he Prosecutor is right when stating 
that excessive drinking before the war 
cannot be taken as a mitigating circum-
stance on the part of the Accused when 
meting out the punishment.” Nonetheless, 
the Appellate Chamber considered the ten-
year sentence to be appropriate considering 
that the accused did not have a high level 
of intent and was not the organizer of the 
entire criminal activity in question.
The exTRaoRdiNaRy chamBeRs  
iN The couRTs of camBodia
On Christmas Day 2007, protestors 
in Cambodia marched in Phnom Penh to 
demonstrate their desire for a speedier res-
olution to the trials of five former Khmer 
Rouge leaders. The protestors’ displeasure 
with the current process is illustrative of 
various problems the ECCC faces, most 
recently with funding. Although the tri-
bunal is budgeted $56.3 million, a heavy 
workload means it will operate through 
2010, as opposed to the original 2009 
deadline. Peter Foster, a UN-appointed 
spokesman for the tribunal, predicts the 
current funds may only last another six 
months because of unexpected costs. For 
example, the tribunal currently employs 
only 14 translators but needs at least 40 to 
translate the 300,000 pages of Cambodian-
language documents into English. 
Donor support was shaken after two 
UN reports in 2007 raised doubts about the 
tribunal’s administration. Specifically, a 
UN audit last spring found that Cambodian 
staff were often under-qualified and 
that the tribunal paid inflated salaries to 
Cambodians. Despite such problems, the 
UN is planning a major fund-raising drive 
that may bring the budget to over $120 mil-
lion. Even the United States, which made 
no contributions to the original budget, is 
considering a donation. Joseph Mussomeli, 
U.S. ambassador to Cambodia, made evi-
dent the United States’ reticence to give, 
stating in a December 26, 2007 article from 
the Associated Press, “It would simply be 
irresponsible to suggest using American 
taxpayer money until we’re sure that the 
administrative process is also fixed.” Such 
doubts notwithstanding, it is ultimately a 
positive sign that the United States is con-
sidering a donation at all. 
Despite the tribunal’s problems, it has 
also made important progress in recent 
months. The ECCC held its first public 
session on November 20, 2007, a pre-trial 
hearing for Kaing Guek Eav, also known 
as Duch. He is charged with crimes against 
humanity for his activities as head of the 
infamous S-21 prison at Tuol Sleng, where 
regime officials tortured and killed thou-
sands of Cambodians. Duch requested bail 
ahead of his trial, scheduled to begin this 
year. Journalists, international observers 
and Cambodian citizens alike packed the 
tribunal’s compound. 
Duch argued he should be released on 
bail because he had already been detained 
for over eight years without a trial. The 
66-year-old has been detained since 1999 
for charges the Cambodian government 
brought against him, and was transferred to 
the ECCC’s custody in late July 2007. On 
December 3, 2007, the five-judge panel, 
composed of three Cambodian judges and 
two UN-appointed international judges, 
unanimously ruled that Duch should 
remain in detention, concluding that if 
Duch were allowed to go free, his life 
could be in danger, he could try to flee the 
country, and he could constitute a threat to 
other witnesses. 
The ECCC has also been bolstered by 
the recent detention of three senior Khmer 
Rouge leaders. Before November 2007, 
Duch and Nuon Chea, known as “Brother 
Number Two” due to his service as Pol 
Pot’s second in command, were the tri-
bunal’s only detainees. On November 12, 
2007, Ieng Sary, who served as foreign 
minister for the Khmer Rouge regime, 
and his wife Ieng Thirith, who served as 
minister for social affairs, were arrested 
at their home in Phnom Penh. The next 
day Sary was charged with war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, while Thirith was 
charged solely with crimes against human-
ity. Sary allegedly perpetrated murders 
and assisted in policies of forcible transfer 
and forced labor. Thirith is suspected of 
orchestrating purges and the murders of 
various members of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs. 
A week later, former Khmer Rouge head 
of state Khieu Samphan was arrested at a 
hospital in Phnom Penh. The 76-year-old 
had been flown to a hospital in Cambodia’s 
capital the week before after suffering 
a stroke. Samphan became president of 
Democratic Kampuchea (as Cambodia was 
referred to at the time) when the Khmer 
Rouge ascended to power. He has consis-
tently argued that his role as president was 
merely ceremonial. Moreover, in his recent 
book Reflection on Cambodian History 
up to the Era of Democratic Kampuchea, 
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takes concrete steps toward reform, such 
as freeing opposition leader and political 
prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi. Suu Kyi has 
been under house arrest since her National 
League for Democracy party won Burma’s 
last democratic parliamentary elections in 
1990. 
The secretive manner in which the 
Charter was drafted also hinders the rati-
fication process. Civil service groups such 
as trade unions, alienated by the closed 
door sessions, actively oppose ratification 
without further input.
The Charter’s weak language and 
ASEAN’s undefined role necessitate strong 
leadership and vision from the Secretary 
General in order to mold ASEAN into a 
legitimate mechanism for upholding the 
rights of citizens. Described as a per-
suasive politician, Pitsuwan received his 
Ph.D. in political science and Middle 
Eastern studies from Harvard University 
in the United States, then ran for a posi-
tion in the Parliament in his home town of 
Nakhon Si Thammarat, Thailand, where 
he served nine terms and was appointed 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. After leaving 
the foreign ministry in 2001, Pitsuwan was 
appointed as a member of the Commission 
on Human Security of the United Nations 
and served as an advisor to the International 
Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, which produced the well-
known Responsibility to Protect report. 
He also served on the International Labor 
Organization’s World Commission on the 
Social Dimension of Globalization. 
Whether the new ASEAN charter 
remains just an academic assertion of lofty 
goals or an institution of fundamental human 
rights depends largely on the decisions 
made in the next five years. Commissioners 
from the national human rights organiza-
tions of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, 
and the Philippines met on January 29 to 
establish a framework for the proposed 
regional body, the ASEAN Human Rights 
Commission. During the two-day meeting, 
the commissioners proposed that members 
of the Commission be appointed by their 
respective foreign ministries from a list of 
candidates drawn by a selection commit-
tee consisting of national institutions and 
civil society. The proposal will go back 
to the four existing national commissions 
and individual national governments for 
further discussion before being submitted 
to ASEAN as a whole.   HRB
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